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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the erroneous summary dismissal of David Brummett' s petition 
for post-conviction relief. The district court erred both in summarily dismissing without proper 
notice and in concluding that Mr. Brummett had not raised a genuine issue of material fact that 
he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to file a motion 
to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the state and federal constitutions. Idaho Const. 
Art. I, §§ 13, 17, Art. XI, § 5; U.S. Const. Amends. 4, 5, 6, and 14. 
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts 
According to a police report, on March 21, 2008, Mr. Brummett was walking on the 
railroad tracks in Nampa. Officer Davis saw him and called him to come over to talk. Mr. 
Brummett, who was wearing headphones, appeared not to hear Officer Davis. Officer Davis then 
yelled and Mr. Brummett came to him. They were separated by a chain link fence topped with 
barbed wire. Officer Davis told Mr. Brummett that he was trespassing and told him to walk 
towards an overpass and climb over the fence. Mr. Brummett said that he was not going that way 
and that he wanted to go toward the train station. At that point, Officer Davis told Mr. Brummett 
that he was not free to leave. R Vol. I, p. 27. 
Officer Davis reported that after repeated requests, Mr. Brummett agreed to walk to the 
overpass. As he was walking, Mr. Brummett stopped, put down his backpack, and put on his 
headphones. This caused Officer Davis to call for backup and to scale the fence to get to Mr. 
Brummett. As Officer Davis climbed the fence, Mr. Brummett started running. A train was 
moving at a slow pace and Mr. Brummett climbed through the middle of two cars. Officer Davis 
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followed and chased Mr. Brummett to a street. Mr. Brummett tripped on a curb, but got back up. 
Officer Davis told him to get on the ground and Mr. Brummett remained standing. So, Officer 
Davis tackled him and put him into handcuffs. Id. 
Officer Davis wrote that as this happened, Mr. Brummett told the officer that he was not a 
bad person and that he did not want to get into trouble. Id. 
Officer Davis searched Mr. Brummett for weapons and found a green leafy substance in 
his pocket. Then Officer Davis searched Mr. Brummett more thoroughly and found a 
hypodermic needle in his jacket pocket and a spoon with white residue. R Vol. I, p. 28. 
At the preliminary hearing, Officer Davis testified that while there was a no trespassing 
sign on the east side of the tracks, there was no sign on the west side where Mr. Brummett was. 
R Vol. II, p. 174. Despite lengthy testimony, Officer Davis never testified that Mr. Brummett's 
location required him to pass the sign on the other side of the tracks or that he had seen Mr. 
Brummett view the sign. R Vol. II, p. 171-177. Rather, he testified that there was only a single 
sign and that it was only visible from the east side of the tracks. R Vol. II, p. 174. 
Mr. Brummett eventually pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine. R Vol. II, p. 
197-201. In the guilty plea advisory form, he noted that his plea was a conditional plea reserving 
the right to appeal the illegal search and seizure. R Vol. I, p. 42. He also wrote that he had asked 
his attorney numerous times to file a motion to suppress, but counsel had refused and he 
therefore believed that he had had inadequate counsel. R Vol. I, p. 43. In the end, neither he nor 
his attorney signed the advisory. R Vol. I, p. 45. 
In the plea colloquy, Mr. Brummett told the court that he was pleading guilty voluntarily, 
freely, knowingly, intentionally, and intelligently and did not mention the lack of a motion to 
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suppress or that the plea was a conditional plea. R Vol. II, p. 197-201. 
The court sentenced Mr. Brummett to a minimum term of three years followed by an 
indeterminate period not to exceed four years for a total term of seven years, concurrent to a 
sentence being served on an Ada County case. R Vol. II, p. 210. 
Mr. Brummett then filed a pro se motion to dismiss on the grounds of an alleged speedy 
trial violation. The court denied the motion. R Vol. II, p. 233-237. 
Thereafter, Mr. Brummett filed a prose Rule 35 motion. R Vol. II, p. 238-255. In his 
affidavit in support of his motion, he noted that he had not even known that he was trespassing at 
the time he was walking on the tracks. R Vol. II, p. 248. 
The court denied the Rule 35 motion. The Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the 
judgment of conviction and sentence imposed. R Vol. II, p. 267. 
Mr. Brummett then filed a prose petition for post-conviction relief. R Vol. I, p. 3-7. In 
his pro se memorandum in support of the petition, he argued that his attorney was ineffective in 
failing to file a motion to suppress because the search and seizure was illegal. He argued that the 
Idaho Constitution Art. XI, § 5 declares that all railroads shall be public highways and 
consequently, he was not trespassing when he was arrested for trespass, thus rendering the arrest 
and subsequent search unconstitutional. R Vol. I, p. 11-13. 
He also noted in his memorandum that the place where he entered the tracks had no sign 
warning that it was not open to the public nor any fence. He wrote that he believed that he was 
free to walk upon this public highway as designated by the state constitution. R Vol. I, p. 23. 
Mr. Brummett also quoted from the trespass statute, LC. § 18-7008, in support of his 
argument that counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress. He noted that the 
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statute requires the presence of no trespassing signs as a predicate to an offense. R Vol. I, p. 25. 
Mr. Brummett supported his petition with several exhibits including a letter to him from 
trial counsel stating that counsel would not file a motion to suppress. Counsel stated that a 
motion to suppress was not warranted because Mr. Brummett had run from the police. R Vol. I, 
p. 37. 
Mr. Brummett also supported his petition with his affidavit wherein he averred that "At 
the place of my entry onto the railroad-public highway, there was at the time no visible, statutory 
requirements and signs of trespassing." R Vol. I, p. 55. 
The court granted Mr. Brummett's request for counsel on the petition. R Vol. I, p. 62-64. 
Counsel filed a motion for judicial notice of certain documents from the underlying 
criminal case. R Vol. II, p. 103-105. Counsel also filed a statement of additional facts. These 
facts included Mr. Brummett' s statement that he had entered the tracks from the north on the 
right side of the underpass on 11 th Avenue in Nampa. From there he crossed over the underpass 
and walked a very short distance in the direction of the train station. Officer Davis was standing 
next to the fence on 1st Street South. When Mr. Brummett realized that Officer Davis wanted to 
talk to him, he walked over, and Officer Davis said that he was trespassing. Mr. Brummett told 
the officer that he was leaving and then the officer told him to climb over the fence topped with 
barbed wire. Mr. Brummett said that he was going to an opening past the old Nampa Museum. 
The officer told him he was not free to go and demanded that he climb over the triple layer of 
barbed wire. Another officer then arrived and the officer climbed over the fence and ran at Mr. 
Brummett. Mr. Brummett got scared and ran. He was then tackled, searched and arrested. R 
Vol. II, p. 261. 
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The district court entered an order of conditional dismissal. In the order, the court took 
judicial notice of the underlying criminal case number CR 2008-8390. R Vol. II, p. 266. 
The court held that it would dismiss the petition because the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim did not raise a genuine issue of material fact. Specifically, the court held that Mr. 
Brummett had failed to provide admissible evidence to support his assertion that the result of the 
proceedings would have been different if counsel had argued that he was on a public railroad 
when he was arrested. The court wrote: "Counsel wrote to Petitioner and explained that a 
Motion to Suppress evidence of his arrest was not warranted because Petitioner ran from police 
after he was told to stop walking on the railroad. Counsel provided appropriate case law 
outlining this conclusion." R Vol. II, p. 271. The court further held that Mr. Brummett had not 
raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding prejudice because he was informed of his rights 
at the plea hearing and he nonetheless entered a guilty plea. R Vol. II, p. 272. 
Mr. Brummett, through counsel, filed an objection to the order of conditional dismissal. 
R Vol. II, p. 279-282. Mr. Brummett set out LC. § 18-7008(9) which defines trespass, noting 
that for an offense to occur, the property must be posted with no trespassing signs or specific 
orange fencing. Mr. Brummett then argued that he had not been trespassing when he was 
arrested. R Vol. II, p. 281-282. Thus, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his 
attorney was ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress. R Vol. II, p. 282. 
Thereafter, the court entered a memorandum decision and order of dismissal. R Vol. II, 
p. 285-289. In its decision, the district court acknowledged Mr. Brummett's argument that he 
was not trespassing at the time he was arrested and then stated that even ifhe was not 
trespassing, counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress was not deficient performance because 
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the arrest could be justified under the community caretaking exception to the Fourth 
Amendment. R Vol. II, p. 288. However, the court did not explain how the police officer was 
exercising his community caretaking function when he tackled Mr. Brummett who was not in 
any danger of being run over by a train or was not a threat to railroad safety as he was by this 
time on a public street. R Vol. II, p. 285-289. Rather, the court segued to the conclusion that the 
officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based upon Mr. Brummett's running away. 
R Vol. II, p. 288. The court then concluded that Mr. Brummett's claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel fails because there was no showing of deficient performance. Id 
A final judgment was entered. R Vol. II, p. 290. 
This appeal timely follows. R Vol. II, p. 292-296. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Brummett's petition without 
giving notice as required by LC.§ 19-4906(b)? 
2. Did the district court err in concluding that Mr. Brummett had not raised a genuine 
issue of material fact as to ineffective assistance of counsel because the community caretaker 
exception to the Fourth Amendment allows police to chase, tackle, arrest, and search a person 
who, while near railroad tracks, is on a public street and in no apparent danger of being injured 
by a train or anything else and presents no threat to safe railroad operations? U.S. Const. 
Amends. 4, 6 and 14; Idaho Const. Art. I, § 17. 
3. Did the district court err in concluding that Mr. Brummett had not raised a genuine 
issue of material fact as to ineffective assistance of counsel because the fact that he ran from the 
police, with nothing more, was sufficient to justify tackling, arresting and searching him? U.S. 
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Const. Amends. 4, 6 and 14; Idaho Const. Art. I,§ 17. 
A. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Brummett's 
Petition Without Proper Notice as Required by I.C. §19-4906(b) 
In its order of conditional dismissal, the district court stated that Mr. Brummett' s petition 
did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to ineffective assistance of counsel because Mr. 
Brummett did not provide admissible evidence to demonstrate that had counsel been aware and 
argued that the Idaho Constitution requires that railroads be treated as public highways that the 
outcome would have been different. R Vol. II, p. 271. 
In response, Mr. Brummett filed an objection which provided evidence to support a 
finding that Mr. Brummett was not trespassing at the time he was arrested because the area was 
not signed or marked as required by I.C. § 18-7008. Therefore, his arrest was in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment and a motion to suppress would have been successful and the outcome of the 
proceedings would have been different. R Vol. II, p. 281-282. 
The district court then dismissed the petition because, even if Mr. Brummett was not 
trespassing, the officer was engaged in community caretaking when he tackled, arrested and 
searched Mr. Brummett and also because Mr. Brummett's act of fleeing provided reasonable 
suspicion for a detention. R Vol. II, p. 288. 
As is well established, I. C. § 19-4906(b) requires that a court give 20-days notice when it 
intends to dismiss a petition on its own motion. The notice must contain the reasons for 
dismissal. Id. And, those reasons must be set out with specificity. Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 
411,421, 128 P.3d 948, 958 (Ct. App. 2005). The purpose of the notice requirement is to allow 
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the petitioner to adequately and appropriately respond to the notice. Id. See also, Buss v. State, 
147 Idaho 514,516,211 P.3d 123, 125 (Ct. App. 2009). Dismissal without proper notice is 
error. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671,676,227 P.3d 925, 930 (2009). 
Here, Mr. Brummett did not receive proper notice as the dismissal was on grounds not 
included in the court's order of conditional dismissal. Therefore, there was error. Id. 
Moreover, the error was not harmless. A lack of notice of the proper grounds for 
dismissal of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel might not be reversible error if the 
defendant petitioner entered a guilty plea but did not show how counsel's failings influenced the 
decision to enter the plea. Id. However, in this case, Mr. Brummett made it very clear that he 
would not have pled guilty had a motion to suppress been filed. And, indeed, as will be 
demonstrated below, had a motion to suppress been filed, it would have been successful and then 
the state would have had no evidence against Mr. Brummett and the case would have been 
dismissed. 
B. The District Court Erred in Concluding That the Community 
Caretaking Exception to the Fourth Amendment Applied in This Case 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable 
searches and seizures. The reasonableness standard imposed by the Fourth 
Amendment requires that the nature of the intrusions upon the individual's 
privacy interest be balanced against the public need and governmental interest 
promoted by the action taken. The state bears the burden of showing 
reasonableness, which we evaluate within the totality of the circumstances. 
State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290,293, 62 P.3d 214,217 (Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted). 
A detention may be constitutionally permissible if it is reasonably conducted in 
furtherance of a government agent's community caretaking function. State v. Maddox, 13 7 Idaho 
821, 824, 54 P.3d 464,467 (Ct. App. 2002), citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 
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2523 (1973). The community caretaking function arises out of the duty of the police to help 
citizens in need of assistance and is "totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or 
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute." Maddox, supra, quoting 
Cady, 413 U.S. at 441, 93 S.Ct. at 2528. 
In analyzing claims that community caretaking justified a detention, Idaho courts 
apply a totality of the circumstances test. The constitutional standard is whether 
the intrusive action of the police was reasonable in view of all the surrounding 
circumstances. The reasonableness of an officer's action in pursuit of community 
caretaking is to be tested upon practicable considerations of everyday life on 
which reasonable persons act. There must be a sufficient public interest furthered 
by the detention to outweigh the degree and nature of the intrusion upon the 
privacy of the detained citizen. 
Maddox, supra (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
Community caretaking cannot be invoked to justify the detention of a citizen that is 
prompted merely by a subjective but unsubstantiated suspicion of criminal activity or even an 
unwarranted concern that help might be needed. Id Thus, community caregiving did not allow 
the detention of occupants of a vehicle that moved forward a few feet, then back, then forward in 
a parking space and then jerked to a stop where the police did not perceive a medical emergency 
or other exigency, but held subjective suspicions that the driver was connected with recent 
burglaries. State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 104, 831 P.2d 942, 946 (Ct. App. 1991). Nor did 
community caretaking allow the detention of a motorist passing by an accident scene long after 
the accident so that police could inquire as to whether the occupants of the vehicle had any 
information about the accident. State v. Wixom, 130 Idaho 752, 947 P.2d 1000 (1997). See also, 
State v. Osborne, 121 Idaho 520,525, 825 P.2d 481,487 (Ct. App. 1991) (detention of individual 
standing by a parked vehicle at 2: 15 a.m. near a lumber yard where, earlier in the evening, police 
9 
had received a report of lights being shot out not within community caretaking function); State v. 
Schmidt, 137 Idaho 301, 47 P.3d 1271 (2002) (detention of individuals sitting a lawfully parked 
car on an unimproved pullout after dark in the winter on officer's subjective belief that the car 
might have run off the road not within community caretaking function); State v. Maddox, supra 
( detention of individual driving car up motor cycle trail in undeveloped foothill area not justified 
under community caretaking function). 
For the community caretaking function to apply, the officer's actions must be "totally 
divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a 
criminal statute." Cady, 413 U.S. at 441, 93 S.Ct. at 2528. Thus, the exception did not apply in 
Osborne, supra, where nothing in the record indicates that the officers perceived a medical 
emergency or other exigency but rather focused on Osborne because of prior reports of 
vandalism. 
In this case, the community caretaker exception to the Fourth Amendment could not 
apply because Officer Davis was concerned with a trespass violation. Cady, supra. Moreover, 
there was no evidence that Mr. Brummett or anyone else was in any danger. To the contrary, 
Officer Davis seemed quite unconcerned about Mr. Brummett's safety- he asked him to climb 
over a fence topped with barbed wire, a very dangerous undertaking and when Mr. Brummett 
declined, the officer chased him so that he had to jump through moving train cars. And, indeed, 
the officer did not stop his chase when Mr. Brummett was no longer near the trains. Rather, he 
tackled Mr. Brummett on a public street - with no evidence that the tackling was done to push 
Mr. Brummett away from any danger. And, to complete the task, Officer Davis arrested Mr. 
Brummett and searched him. Even if somehow someone could conclude that the exception 
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applied at the beginning of the chase, the justification for it ended well before Mr. Brummett was 
tackled. It could not justify the arrest and search in any event. Clearly, the actions of Officer 
Davis did not fall within the community caretaker exception to the Fourth Amendment. Cady, 
supra; Maddox, supra. 
C. The District Court Erred in Concluding That Mr. Brummett Had Not 
Raised a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel Because the Fact That He Ran from the Police, With Nothing 
More, Was Sufficient to Justify Tackling, Arresting and Searching 
Him 
The district court also dismissed Mr. Brummett' s petition because it concluded that by 
running from the officer Mr. Brummett created a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to 
justify his detention. R Vol. II p. 288. This analysis is flawed because flight is just one element 
of the applicable totality of the circumstances test. Under the totality of the circumstances, there 
was not a basis for a stop. Thus, Mr. Brummett did raise a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether counsel was deficient in failing to file a motion to suppress. 
Per Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968), an officer may conduct a brief, 
investigatory stop when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is 
afoot. 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884. Per Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673 
(2000), a totality of circumstances analysis is applied when considering whether reasonable 
suspicion existed. And, flight is but one circumstance, not a definitive circumstance by itself, 
which is considered in the totality of the circumstances. Id 
Insofar as the district court concluded that flight, without more, justified the stop of Mr. 
Brummett, the court simply failed to apply the required totality of the circumstances analysis. Id 
Mr. Brummett did, in fact, raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether counsel was 
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deficient in failing to file a motion to suppress because if the state could not provide a stronger 
basis for the stop than simply Mr. Brummett' s flight, the motion to suppress would have been 
successful. The record as it now exists would not have justified the stop: there was no valid 
reason to arrest for trespass and it was only Mr. Brumrnett's presence near the railroad tracks that 
was noted by Officer Davis. There was no behavior that indicated any sort of criminal activity. 
And, even if the state could provide more basis for the stop, the question would remain 
whether the state could justify the seizure of the marijuana, as Terry allows a pat down for 
weapons - not a search for drugs. Unless the marijuana could have been mistaken for a weapon, 
it was not properly seized. And, it was the seizure of the marijuana that led to the actual arrest 
which led to the search that revealed the methamphetamine residue. See Hoffman v. State, 153 
Idaho 898,905,277 P.3d 1050, 1057 (Ct. App. 2012), holding that summary dismissal was 
erroneous when, based upon the record before the district court, a motion to suppress may well 
have succeeded and altered the outcome of the case. As in Hoffman, summary dismissal was 
inappropriate because based on the record before the district court a motion to suppress may well 
have succeeded and altered the outcome of the case by eliminating all the incriminating evidence 
against Mr. Brummett. 
12 
V. CONCLUSION 
The district court erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Brummett's petition, both because 
the court failed to give proper notice and because Mr. Brummett did raise a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether he was denied effective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to 
file a motion to suppress. Mr. Brummett asks either that this Court find that counsel was 
ineffective and grant Mr. Brummett post-conviction relief or that this Court reverse the order of 
summary dismissal and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing. 
tL 
Respectfully submitted this Z Jday of February, 2015. 
Deborah Whipple 
Attorney for David B 
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